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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
OKLAND LTD., INC., and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 21032
OKLAND LTD., INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUG BRADSHAW, ROBERT M.
SIMONSEN, CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP,
a limited partnership,
and JOHN DOES 1 - 5 ,
Third-Party Defendants.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether there are sufficient disputed material facts

to warrant reversal of the Summary Judgment entered against

Defendant-Appellant Okland Ltd., Inc. (hereinafter "Okland" or
"Appellant") and in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent, First
Security Financial (hereinafter "First Security" or
"Respondent"), including but not limited to the following:
(a)

no proof of damages;

(b)

no reasonable relationship between the alleged

default of Okland and the damages awarded; and
(c) no proof that Respondent has any interest in the
matters complained of in its Complaint.
2.

Whether the Summary Judgment is supported by the writ-

ten Equipment Lease Agreement as a matter of law (hereinafter
"Lease" [R. 3-6; A. 3-6]), and if so, whether the Lease should
be declared void as a penalty.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This appeal is taken from the final Summary Judgment
entered by the Honorable Judith M. Billings in the Third
Judicial District Court against Okland and in favor of
Respondent (Summary Judgment, R.

257-58; A. 30-33).

The action involved the alleged breach or default of an
Equipment Lease Agreement ("Lease" [R. 3-6; A. 3-6]) covering
certain furniture and equipment purchased by Murray First Thrift
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Leasing (hereinafter "MFT" [Respondent's alleged predecessor])
and a "leaseback" to co-Defendants Okland and Bradshaw-Ferrin
Development Company (the latter, hereinafter "Defendant
Bradshaw"), on September 30, 1981, for the exclusive use in the
pre-offer and sale of condominium units at the then-to-be-built
Wilshire Project ("Wilshire Condominiums") located at 10th East
and 4th South Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Summary Judgment

was entered against Defendant Bradshaw for his default on the
Lease on June 4, 1985, at which time Respondent calculated the
accelerated balance on the Lease at $26,423.95 (R. 123-25).
On October 15, 1985, Summary Judgment against Okland was
formally entered by the lower court from which this appeal is
taken.

Such appeal involves Okland and Respondent exclusively,

and as a result, third parties not affected by this Summary
Judgment have stipulated to its finality for purposes of appeal.
After considering arguments by the respective counsel for
Respondent and Okland, and based on a review of the pleadings
and record, the lower court found as a matter of law, that
(1) there were no factual issues concerning the nature of the
subject contract and the damages awarded; (2) the Respondent
had properly pursued its remedies; and (3) there was no evidence to support Okland1s allegation that the Respondent failed
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to mitigate its damages (Judge's
35-39).

Ruling, R. 370-73; A.

Based on these findings and other findings of the

Honorable Judith M. Billings contained in the Judge's Ruling,
the lower court entered Summary Judgment against Okland for
$24,030.89, or the total alleged unpaid balance remaining
on the Lease; $363.52 for 1984 property taxes; $384.80 for
1985 property taxes; $1,201.25 for future monthly "late charges"
prospectively assessed on the alleged accelerated balance;
$6,055.77 in interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per
annum on the amount so accelerated under the Lease since May
1984; and $1,900.00 in attorney's fees, for a total judgment of
$33,893.23.

The Summary Judgment also granted interest on the

total amount awarded at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per
annum from the date of entry until paid, including accruing
costs, attorney's fees and future expenses of location,
repossession, and sale of the equipment which was the subject of
the Lease; and the court further granted Respondent all
necessary writs and orders of any nature to recover the equipment, if, when, and apparently wherever located, such costs and
expenses to be prospectively accessed Okland (R. 257-58; A.
30-33) .
The Honorable Judith M. Billings also found the total
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amount "promised" under the Lease was the proper "remedy since
there has been no repossession of equipment because the
equipment has disappeared.", at R. 372; A. 38. The lower court
also stated in answer to questions posed by Appellant's counsel
concerning a trial on the issue of damages, " . . . No. I
think the [supporting] affidavit is sufficient evidence of
damages and there are no contravening affidavits to indicate
those damages are not correct.", at R. 373; A. 39.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, as the alleged successor in interest to
MFT, brought an action in the lower court against Okland and
Defendant Bradshaw for breach of the Lease.

The Lease was for

a term of 60 months, with payments of $775.19 per month, commencing September 30, 1981, and ending September 29, 1986
(Complaint and Exhibit "A", [R. 2-6; A. 1-6]).

The Lease

reflects that the first and last payments were paid on execution of the Lease (R. 3; A. 3) leaving 58 remaining payments
upon execution.
Okland, in answering the Complaint made it clear to the
Court and Respondent that it was in no position to verify any of
Respondent's claims, while readily admitting liability under the
Lease to MFT (Original Answer, Amended Answer, Cross-Claim and
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Third-Party Complaint [specifically, 1MI 1-5 inclusive, of the
Cross-Claim], R. 13-14, 191-93; A. 7-14).
Okland affirmatively asserted that Respondent's Complaint
failed to state a claim against it; that Okland had acted in
good faith; and that Respondent had failed in any respect to
attempt to mitigate the damages of which it complained (R.
189-96; A. 7-14) .
Okland also made clear that it executed the Lease in contemplation of constructing the Wilshire Condominiums, and the
equipment covered by the Lease was purchased by Defendant
Bradshaw, sold to MFT, and "leased back" for this purpose. Okla
further alleged that approximately 60 days after execution of
the Lease, it withdrew from negotiations to construct the
Wilshire Condominiums and failed to apply to MFT for written
permission to be removed as a guarantor in reliance on representations of Defendant Bradshaw that written permission would not
be necessary (R.

189-96; A.

7-14).

Additionally, Okland

stated that it believed Defendant Bradshaw and other named and
unnamed successors-in-interest, including other third-party
defendants, may have been released by Respondent or MFT, and
that at all times, Defendant Bradshaw and third-party defendants
had had the exclusive use, benefit and enjoyment of all equip-
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ment covered by the Lease (R.

189-96; A. 7-14).

This same fac-

tual information was given to Respondent in the initial Answer,
Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint filed by Okland (R.
13-14).

The Amended Answer, Cross-Claim and Third-Party

Complaint included additional affirmative defenses to the effect
that there was a failure of consideration and that MFT was a
"secured party" only with respect to the equipment covered by
the Lease (R. 189-96; A. 7-14).
On April 4, 1985, without having conducted any [emphasis
added] discovery in nearly a year since filing of the action,
Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Okland
and Defendant Bradshaw, asking the lower court for judgment
against each, jointly and severally in the sum of $26,423.95,
together with interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per
annum, costs of court, expenses of repossession and sale and
attorney's fees (R. 40-41).

The Motion was supported by an

affidavit of Respondent's counsel covering his attorney's fees
(R. 36-37), and an affidavit of C. S. Cummings (R. 34-35; A.
15-16).

The affidavit of Mr. Cummings stated that he was an

officer of First Security Financial and authorized to give the
affidavit; that the matters set forth in the affidavit were of
his own knowledge; that he had reviewed the Respondent's
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Complaint and knew the contents thereof to be true; that he had
reviewed the original Lease and believed the Lease attached to
Respondent's Complaint to be identical in every respect; and as
of the date of his affidavit, Okland and Defendant Bradshaw were
indebted [emphasis added] to Respondent in the amount of
$26,423.95, as calculated on the Lease, together with interest,
plus expenses and attorney's fees, etc. (R. 34-35; A. 15-16).
At the same time Okland's counsel filed an affidavit
in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Respondent
indicating that he had had conversations with Respondent's counsel, Kyle W. Jones, who had indicated to him that the Lease was
a "sale-leaseback" and not a "true" lease; and that prior to
being required to formally respond to Okland's First Set of
Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents and
Request for Admissions, Mr. Jones had indicated to him that no
documentation or other information existed or was available
regarding the Lease, whether or not it was a "sale-leaseback",
including, but not limited to the absence of documentation as to
the disposition of the equipment upon termination of the Lease;
the residual at the expiration of the Lease; the payout; the
actual damages of the Respondent; the beneficiary of any investment tax credit; depreciation; the useful life of the equipment;
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or any other factual matter relevant to the Lease Agreement between the parties and the liabilities for its breach.
A. 20-22).

(R. 70-72;

Not one [emphasis added] of these facts has ever

been controverted by Respondent, its counsel, or anyone else.
Okland, through James G. Okland, at the same time also
filed an affidavit in opposition to Respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment (R.

47-50) in which he also disputed the bare

unsupported allegations of damages, and again made it clear to
Respondent that Okland was not in a position to obtain information to verify the truth or accuracy of the matters outlined
in affidavits in support of the Respondent's Motion; and also,
that he believed the equipment which was the subject of the
Lease was of substantial value and could be so disposed of to
limit Okland's liability (R. 47-50).
At such April hearing, the lower court granted Summary Judgment
in favor of the Respondent as against Defendant Bradshaw (R.
123-25) and continued Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment
against Okland without date.
From April through September 1985, Okland vigorously and
diligently pursued Third-Party Defendants, Doug Bradshaw, Bob
Simonson, City Gate Condominium Partnership, and Cross-Claimant
Defendant Bradshaw, in an effort to locate the equipment and
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mitigate its damages (R. 262-64, 53-54f 130-31, 271-72,
357-58, 364-65, 138-39, 172-73, 197-99).

Okland also submitted

Interrogatories and Request fo. Production of Documents to
Respondent and also took the deposition of one former employee
of MFT (R. 42-43, 13-114, 138-139), the only individual really
competent to testify on MFT (or Respondent's behalf), namely the
leasing agent or broker who negotiated the Lease on September
30, 1981 (R. 369; 211-214) .
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Okland was
finally heard approximately six months later on September 23,
1985.

In support of the renewed Motion for Summary Judgment,

Respondent filed an additional affidavit of one D. R.
which states:

Russell

That he had access to the files of First Security

Financial and was authorized by it to make his affidavit; that
the matters set forth were true of his own knowledge; that he
had reviewed the allegations of the Complaint of Respondent and
knew the contents to be true; that he had reviewed the corporate
resolution of Okland, a check of MFT written to defendants and
the related Bill of Sale concerning the equipment covered by the
Lease and that all such documents were identical in every
respect to the originals; that the equipment listed on the
Schedules to the Lease was delivered to the defendants, and
that. • •
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"it [equipment] has not been repossessed by the
Plaintiff; . . .
"6. That as of the date of this affidavit,
defendant Okland is indebted [emphasis added] to
the plaintiff pursuant to the Equipment Lease
Agreement as follows:
a.

31 payments at $775.19
(last payment 2/29/84)

$24,030.89

b.

property taxes for 1984

363.52

c.

property taxes for 1985

341.80

d.

Late charges (31 months)
(.05 x 775.19 = $38.75)

1,201.25

e.

Interest (18% per annum
from May 1, 1984)

6,055.77
$31,993.23

together with attorney's fees as provided by the
Equipment Lease Agreement and the expenses of location,
repossession and sale of the leased equipment" (R. 232-41,
specifically 233; A. 17-19, specifically 18).
The September 1985 amended affidavit of James G. Okland
filed on behalf of Okland in opposition to Respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment states that Mr. Okland is the Secretary of
Okland Ltd., Inc. and authorized to make the statement on behalf
of the Appellant; that the statements made are based on personal
knowledge; that he signed the Lease on behalf of Defendant
Okland with MFT; that the Lease does not reflect the actual
agreement and intent of Okland, Defendant Bradshaw and MFT in
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that Okland and Defendant Bradshaw would own all of the equipment covered by the Lease at the end of the Lease and that title
would pass to them; that he believed the equipment could be released, soldf or otherwise disposed of at substantial value and
return? that MFT had agreed that Defendant Bradshaw would own
the equipment at the end of the Lease and the Agreement was
styled in lease form so that MFT could receive the investment
tax credit; that Okland had never received an accounting of the
application of payment made and believes that the amount claimed
in the Respondent's Complaint of $26,423.95 as of May 1, 1984,
was erroneous; that the demand letters received from Respondent
in April and May, 1984, were for differing amounts (also, from
different entities, [R. 207-08]) than that set forth in
Respondent's Complaint; that no accounting had been made concerning the first and last payments made on the execution of the
Lease as reflected therein; that to the knowledge of Mr. Okland,
the Respondent had not attempted to sell or otherwise dispose of
the equipment to decrease the damages which Respondent allegedly
stated had been incurred as a result of alleged delinquent
payments; and further, that Respondent had never made any
attempt to retrieve or even locate the furniture (R. 202-08; A.
28-29).

He further stated that there had been a discussion of
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"residual" value

or contract to purchase when the Lease was

made which would further reduce damages when credited (R.
202-08; A. 28-29)•
Based on the foregoing, the Honorable Judith M. Billings
entered Summary Judgment in favor of Respondent for each of the
amounts set forth in the affidavit of D. R. Russell (R. 233; A*
18), awarding further costs, expenses, and attorneys fees in
locating and repossessing the equipment, including any future
writs and orders in pursuit thereof (R. 257-58; A. 35-39).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The only undisputed relevant and material facts in this
action are those either admitted by Okland or claimed by Okland
in its Answer, Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint (initial
and amended) and supporting affidavits of James G. Okland
and its counsel in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Okland admitted it executed the Lease with MFT; that
MFT had not released it from any liability; that it believed codefendant Bradshaw or other successors-in-interest may have been
released from any liability under the Lease by MFT; that
Defendant Bradshaw or others had had the exclusive use,
benefit, and enjoyment of all of the equipment covered by the
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Lease; that it had no information as to what had been paid or
what was due under the Lease; that it believed the equipment
which was the subject of the Lease was valuable and could be
sold or leased; and that it had no information as to the
whereabouts of the leased equipment [emphasis added] . Not one
of these allegations has been denied or even remotely met by
Respondent.
Respondent's unverified Complaint and affidavits in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment are replete with
conclusions of law, unsupported by any relevant facts, disputed
or otherwise.

Respondent has further failed to show it has any

right to bring this action as there is no evidence to prove it
is the successor-in-interest to MFT.

In this respect,

Respondent relies on the affidavits of two persons, one claiming
to be an officer of First Security Financial and the other
claiming to have had "access" to the files of First Security
Financial, neither obviously, having an inkling as to the nature
and intent of the Lease Agreement in issue as it involved MFT.
Further, the carefully couched affidavit of the person with mere
"access" to the nebulous files of First Security Financial, not
MFT, epitomizes Respondent's total defiance of the facts and
absence of proof of its case with the statement that "it (the
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leased equipment) has not been repossessed" (R. 234; A. 18).
This allegation alone leaves every other possibility open,
including prior sale or other disposition for value, receipt of
insurance proceeds for loss of the leased equipment, including
the fact that Respondent knew where the equipment was all along
knowing Okland did not.
Respondent would have one believe the denial by Okland of
each and every allegation of Respondent's Complaint on the basis
that Okland did not possess sufficient information to otherwise
respond to the allegations was in bad faith.

In the Memorandum

of Respondent in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
154-158, specificially p. 156)f counsel for Respondent twists
Okland1s good faith denial of lack of information to its advantage by claiming its affidavits in support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment clearly show Respondent to be the successor-ininterest to MFTf and further that they evidence the exact undeniable amount due and owing by Okland to Respondent. Counsel
for Respondent further states that none of the discovery conducted by Okland or other parties has brought "in anything to
change the above stated facts."

With empty, self-serving

responses like these to Okland1s First Set of Interrogatories to
Plaintiff-Respondent, one need not wonder why the discovery con-
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ducted by Okland was fruitless as Respondent therein admits to-

"3. Please state what measures you have undertaken to date to mitigate any damages for the
alleged default on the lease.
"ANSWER: At present, plaintiff is attempting
to locate the equipment, it has filed a lawsuit
seeking damages from the lessees and has completely
complied with the duties and obligations set forth
under the Lease Agreement, and have given notices to
the lessees that a default has occurred and that
they expect payment to be made.
"4. Please state which party or parties specifically made lease payments on each occasion from
the period of the commencement of the lease until
the date of its alleged default.
"ANSWER: Plaintiff has no records of which
party or parties specifically made the lease
payments on the aforementioned Lease Agreement.
All billings were sent directly to the lessee and
any payments received were applied directly to the
lease per any written instructions received. . . .
"12. Please indicate and itemize your out-ofpocket, actual, hard cash damages, exclusive of
attorney's fees and other costs.
"ANSWER: Under the terms of the Lease
Agreement defendants were to pay sixty (60)
payments at $775.19. There still remains due and
owing thirty-one (31) payments under the aforementioned lease document leaving a balance due and
owing of $24,202.63, there is also property taxes
for 1984 that were paid by plaintiff in the amount
of $363.52 plus possible 1985 estimated property
taxes of $363.52. There is also included late fees
on this lease in the amount of $2,170.92 together
with the value of the equipment at the end of the
lease, plus possible sales tax if it was to be
sold, plus court costs and legal fees and interest."
(Plaintiff's Answers to Okland1s First Set of
Interrogatories.)
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Okland's good faith admission of liability under the Lease
with MFT was for naught.

Eighteen months elapsed between the

filing of the Complaint and the hearing on Respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment, and there is still no evidence of
Respondent's legitimate interest in the Lease or damages it has
allegedly suffered, if any, as a direct result of the alleged
default on the Lease.

Respondent, if it is the successor-in-

interest to MFT, is and was always in a position to provide
this information, and has had a duty to do so by virtue of
Okland's responsive pleadings on file, particularly when
Respondent knew or should have known who made payments to it all
those months and thus knew or should have known the location of
the furniture upon default.

Respondent should not be permitted

to profit by this unequivocal display of bad faith.
The Summary Judgment granted against Okland defies all
basic logic and legal premises. The total amount of the Summary
Judgment coupled with the payments claimed by Respondent to have
been made under the Lease total $57,924,12, an amount substantially exceeding the total value of the five year Lease (sixty
payments at $775.19 or $46,511.40) in which 2l^> years remained
upon alleged default.
Paragraph 14 of the Lease provides the lessor with an
option for remedies in the event the leased equipment is lost or
-17-

destroyed, and the remedies granted Respondent by the lower
court do not comport with the provisions of the Lease in this
regard, assuming the equipment was indeed lost or destroyed.
Further, the Lease also provides for repossession and sale of
the leased equipment in the event lease payments are accelerated, with resulting credit of the proceeds of any such sale,
after the deduction of related costs and expenses to lessee.
The award of the lower court is conspicuously deficient and far
afield from the Lease's terms in this respect.

The lower court

seems to view the remedies contained in the Lease as cumulative,
and this fact alone brings to mind simple but true axioms of law
such as penalties being void, that an aggrieved party is entitled
only to the benefit of its bargain; that an aggrieved party is
entitled to be placed in the position it would have been in had
the default not occured, and that he who seeks equity must to
equity.

Quite clearly, an acceleration of lease payments with

interest and with "late charges" added to each payment accelerated (as they are not at such time "past due"), together with
prospective interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per
annum on such accelerated amount (including sales and use taxes
on allegedly lost equipment) is absurd.
This matter should be reversed and remanded with instruc-
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tions to the lower court to find as a matter of law that if
Respondent can show it is the successor-in-interest to MFT that
it further show that it acted in a "commercially reasonably
manner" in failing to take any action whatsoever to dispose of
the equipment.

In this regard, it is the responsibility of

this Court to set such guidelines as to whether Respondent is
foreclosed from a deficiency judgment or otherwise should be
"no-caused"—a responsibility for and finding of which in this
case this Court should not shrink from*
ARGUMENTS
POINT 1.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
PLEADINGS, DEPOSITIONS, ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES,
AND ADMISSIONS ON FILE AS THEY DO NOT SHOW AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS
TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AS AWARDED.
Blatant and uncontroverted disputes of genuine material
fact exist and therefore upholding the Summary Judgment would
deprive Appellant of its day in court and the right to make its
case thereby substantially altering the Summary Judgment.
Alleged "Rental" Payment Balance —

31 Payments or What?

Respondent's affidavit in Support of its Motion for Summary
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Judgment (R. 232-34; A. 17-19) attests that the last payment made
by lessees was on February 21, 1984.

Respondent does not allege

that the Lease was in default prior to that time; this porposition coupled with the Lease, evidences that first and last
payments were paid on September 30, 1981, amounting to 31
payments or a total payment on the Lease of $24,030.89 until the
time of the alleged default.

If $24,030.89 was paid on the

Lease and $44,296.80 was the total due under the Lease (Discount
Sheet R. 216), the balance due and owinq Respondent on the date
of alleged default would have been $20,265.91—an obvious difference from that awarded in the Summary Judgment.

It is

noteworthy that in Appellant's affidavit in Opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment, the lower court was apprised that
Respondent's calculation of damages was in issue as it had never
made and could not render an accounting to Appellant (R.
202-208, specifically 1(8).

(See Summary of Argument, supra, and

the evasive responses of Respondent to Okland's Interrogatories
therein.)
Assuming $20,265.91 was the total due under the terms of
the Lease (through September 1, 1986 [emphasis added]) upon
alleged default in March 1984, the Summary Judgment awarding
Respondent accelerated damages in the amount of nearly
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$34,000.00 at eighteen percent (18%) interest per annum until
paid, plus after accruing costs, attorney's fees and expenses of
location, repossession and resale of the equipment, including
ownership of the leased equipment, is a far cry from the
$20-some Thousand Dollars Respondent would have received at the
end of 1986. Appellant is not even awarded use of the leased
equipment, despite being required to pay the lease in full and
more [emphasis added].

In addition, based on the fact that MFT

actually bought the equipment for approximately $25,800.00 and
appears to have received at least $24,000.00, on the Lease,
Respondent, if a rightful assignee, is actually out-of-pocket
only $1,800.00.
"Late Charges" (Paragraph 20 of the Lease)
The Summary Judgment further awards $1,201.25 in "late
charges" on the alleged accelerated balance (31 payments) pursuant to the Lease (R. 258; A. 31). No authority exists for
this proposition.

It amounts to a windfall to Respondant and a

penalty to Okland.
Interest From May 1, 1984 Until October 15, 1985 on
the Alleged and Unproven Balance
The Summary Judgment further awards $6,055.77 in interest
(eighteen percent [18%]) on the disputed $24,030.89 balance from
the period of commencement of the suit until the Summary
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Judgment was entered.
Okland admitted its liability under the Lease at the outset
and asked only for proof of Respondent's rights in the Lease and
an accounting of damages which it could not ascertain.

The law

in Utah is clear that prejudgment interest is not a matter of
right, but awarded only where the party against whom it is
sought caused the delay in payment.

L.A. Drywall, Inc. v.

Whitmore Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (1980 Utah).

Any

delay in resolving this matter was caused by failure of
Respondent to provide proof of its interest and an accounting
and its apparent bad faith in thwarting the efforts of Okland to
mitigate damages or to ascertain any damages Respondent may have
suffered.

(See Summary of Argument, supra.)

Use or Sales Taxes (Paragraph 16 of the Lease)
The Summary Judgment awards 1984 and 1985 sales or use
taxes of approximately $1,144.00 and yet the lower court ruled
as a "matter of law" that the equipment had "disappeared" or was
lost (R. 370-73).

Pursuant to Section 59-16-3 (U.C.A.), pro-

perty must be stored, used or otherwise consumed in this State
for collection of any such tax.

Furthermore, there is no evi-

dence whatsoever that Respondent or anyone had or has not paid
any such tax or that it is due or payable.
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Sufficiency of Affidavits
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there are numerous
issues of fact for trial on the issue of damages alone. Okland
has produced evidentiary material in total contradiction to
Respondent's claims, and it is otherwise apparent from the
record why Okland could not directly contradict many of
Respondent's allegations as it was not in a position of access
to necessary information.

As a result, its denial placed all of

Respondent's allegations in issue.

In Dupler v. Yates, 251 P.2d

624, 637, (Utah 1960), headnote 8, coupled with Justice Wade's
dissent states that when considering motions under Rule 56 it
[position of access] "should be kept in mind in passing on this
kind of motion [Summary Judgment].

Otherwise trial courts will

be deciding cases on affidavits and depositions when there
should be a regular trial."
Further, the pleadings and affidavits of Respondent in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment are based on conclusions
of law only, and Summary Judgment will only be granted when supported by affidavits which set forth facts admissible in evidence.

Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., 596 P.2d 1025, 1026

(Utah 1979); and Norton v. Blackham, 599 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah
1983) .
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Also Respondent has failed to act in a "commercially reasonable" manner as a matter of law pursuant to 70A-9-504
1953 as amended and should be foreclosed from any award.

U.C.A.,
(See

Summary of Arguments, supra.)
Mitigation of Damages
Appellant need not belabor the point that under the circumstances of this case and Utah law, Respondent had a duty to
mitigate its damages. Thompson v. Jacobsen, 463 P.2d 801, 23
Utah 2d 359 (1970); Diede v. Davis, (Mont. 1983) 661 P.2d 838;
Double D Amusement v. Hawkins, 20 Utah 2d 395, 438 P.2d

395

(1968).
In Green, et al. v. Nelson, 120 Utah 155, 232 P.2d 776,
(1951, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"There are authorities holding that the burden of
proving matters in mitigation or reduction of the
amount of plaintiff's damages rests upon a defendant.
1 Sedgwick on Damages, 9th Ed. 447 §227. However,
such authority should not be relied upon as imposing
the burden on a defendant to prove one of the essential
facts which must be established in order to determine
what plaintiff's damages are. There can be no mitigation
or reduction of damages until damages are proved. [Emphasis
added] Green, supra, at 783.
There is not a shred of evidence offered by Respondent
showing any good faith effort to mitigate its damages and locate
the leased equipment or that it otherwise should not have brought
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suit earlier for adequate assurances of performance, especially
after assignment from MFT and knowing, if so, that no insurance
existed to protect its new interest.

For this reason alone,

Respondent's actions and the question of whether it acted in a
"commercially reasonable manner" in disposing of the leased
equipment or failing to make any disposition of it should be
determined at trial.

Respondent's unilateral interpretation of

the Lease (to which it was not party), is that it had no duty
whatsoever to attempt to even locate the leased equipment
despite being in a better position than Okland to have access to
information so Okland could act to mitigate its own damages.
(See Summary of Argument, supra.)
In Haggis Management, Inc. v. Turtle Management, Inc., 19
Ut. Adv. Rpt. 42 (Oct. 3, 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held
that plaintiff's failure to make a "commercially reasonable
disposition" of the collateral contrary to the requirement of
70A-9-504(3) (U.C.A. 1953, [1980 Ed.]) barred plaintiff from
recovering a deficiency judgment based on failure of the secured
party to give the debtor notice.

In this case Respondent's

inaction is ridiculously more prejudicial to the rights of Okland
than plaintiff Haggis' mere notice failures with respect to
Turtle Management.

Based on the logic of Haggis (including the
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well reasoned dissent of Justice Stewart [Utah 1979]), it is
Appellant's contention that Respondent's intentional failure to
mitigate its damages in even attempting to locate the furniture
and its dedication to do nothing was not commercially reasonable
and Respondent's action or lack thereof should bar Respondent
from recovering any judgment from Okland.
Parol Evidence Regarding Damages
The lower court guite casually excluded any evidence of an
oral understanding to purchase the leased equipment or any
understandings with respect to whether the Lease was an
installment sale, a lease, one intended for security, or a
contract of guarantee, or even what its purpose was aside from
its label.

In Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, (Utah 1981) 624 P.2d

706, the Utah Supreme Court held that a "lease agreement may not
be what it purports to be. How these issues bear on
Respondent's damages and the remedies available to it are factual considerations that the lower court has totally ignored.
Okland's affidavit (R. 202-08; A.23-29) puts these considerations into issue, and are uncontroverted.

Also quotations

from the deposition testimony of DeMar Riley, the sales leasing
agent (R. 211-214, 369) and former employee of MFT, demonstrate that he offered lessees (Okland and Defendant
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Bradshaw) the opportunity to purchase the leased equipment based
on the low residual of five percent (5%).

Based on the

reasoning of FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro Printers, 590 P.2d 803
(Utah 1979) , the integration clause in the lease (which in that
case did not mention such option), should be rendered ineffective to exclude parol evidence of the existence of the agreement
of the parties.

Furthermore, it is quite clear that the Lease

is unintegrated in that it does not even reflect the true nature
of the transaction, that being, that it was a "sale-leaseback";
that MFT purchased the leased equipment for slightly in excess
of $25,000.00 from Defendant Bradshaw; and that Defendant
to Bradshaw had purchased it for its specific uses; and had sold it
MFT only to lease it back.
Support for the admission of parol evidence in this case is
further confirmed by the recent Utah case of Union Bank vs.
Swenson, 19 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 22 (Sept. 27, 1985) in which the Court
held inter alia, ". . . a Court must first determine whether the
writing was intended by the parties to be an integration. In
resolving this preliminary question of fact, parol evidence,
indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible.

Eie v. St.

Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981)."
supra, at 23.
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Union Bank,

In Blem v. Ringerinq, 488 P.2d 798, 260 Or. 46 (1971), the
Supreme Court of Oregon held the parties may enter into two or
more contemporaneous contracts relating to the same subject
matter and they may reduce to writing only one or more of the
same, the oral contracts being regarded as collateral and
distinct from the written contract; in such instance the parol
evidence rule does not bar proof of the oral agreement.
In Alexander v. Simmons, 518 P.2d 160, 90 Nev. 23 (1974),
the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the mere existence of a
written contract is insufficient to prevent a party from showing
a separate contemporaneous oral agreement.
Based on the foregoing, the Summary Judgment should be
reversed and remanded so that we might understand what MFT,
Okland and Defendant Bradshaw intended.

Respondent is the mere

alleged assignee of MFT and is in no position to know what the
agreement of the parties was.

Finally, it is noteworthy that in

the Summary Judgment rendered against Defendant Bradshaw,
Respondent calculated the principal amount past due and owing
under the Lease to be $26,423.95.

This discrepancy on its face

reveals that Respondent itself has not but a clue as to what its
actual damages are, let alone what or when or by whom payments
were made.
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POINT 2.
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY THE LEASE
AND IF SO, THE LEASE SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS A
PENALTY,
Lease
Paragraph 14 of the Lease (R. 3 [reverse side] ; A. 3) provides certain remedies to Lessor in the event of loss or damage
to the leased equipment.

Specifically, in the event of loss or

damage to the leased equipment, it provides that the lessee, at
the option of lessor, will replace the leased equipment in good
condition and repair; or replace the same with like equipment in
good condition and repair with clear title in lessor; or pay to
lessor the total of the following amounts:

the total rent due

and owing at the time of such payment [emphasis added], plus the
present value [emphasis added] of all rent and other amounts
payable by lessee with respect to said item from date of such
payment to date of expiration of the lease; plus the value of
said item which shall be equal to not less than ten percent
(10%) purchase price on said item.

It further provides that

upon lessor's receipt of such payments, lessee and lessee's
insurer shall be entitled to lessor's interest in said item, for
salvage purposes, in its then condition and location, without
warranty.

Even if we were to assume the leased equipment is
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lost (no evidence has been introduced to prove this fact),
Respondent has totally failed to make any such election or provide Okland with the calculations required of it under this provision of the Lease.

Furtherf the award of all right, titlef

and interest in the leased equipment to Respondent, together
with expenses of location and other related costs, is totally
contrary to paragraph 14 of the Lease.
Paragraph 21 covers matters related to default under the
lease (R. 3 [reverse side]; A. 3). It provides the lessor may
recover from lessee all rents and other amounts then due and as
they shall thereafter [emphasis added] become due; that the
lessor may take possession of the equipment; that the lessor may
recover from lessee with or without repossessing the leased
equipment the accelerated and total sum of all rent and other
amounts due and to become due; "provided, however, that upon
repossession or surrender of equipment, lessor may sell or
otherwise dispose of equipment. . . and apply the net proceeds
thereof after deducting all expenses, including attorney's fees
. . . as required by law or in equity." The only logical
meaning these two paragraphs could have, when read together, is
that so long as the lessees have the use of the leased equipment,
they should be required to pay sums due thereunder.
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Respondent

was made aware at the outset that Okland did not have the
possession or use of the leased equipment, and was not in any
position to ascertain its location, especially in light of the
position taken by the Respondent that it may have been lost.
Under Respondent's view of the Lease, lessee under the Lease
could have given a "bad check" for the first and last payments
under the Lease, on its execution, and Respondent could accelerate all sixty (60) payments under the Lease ($46,511.40 [R.
3, 216; A. 34]) and still recover the leased equipment—pray
tell if it was lost in the interim.
In other words, the Summary Judgment stands for the proposition that a lessor can accelerate the lease, later repossess
the alleged lost equipment and re-lease it for the remainder of
the original lease term for a "double-recovery".
Liquidated Damages and Penalties
In the event the Summary Judgment can be reconciled with
the terms and provisions of the Lease, the Appellant believes
the Lease should be declared void as a penalty.
Respondent has made no showing of proof of its actual
damages so as to even determine if they are reasonably related
to the accelerated damages awarded and therefore, the summary
judgment should be reversed and remanded for findings as to
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damages, the meaning of the contract, and whether the Lease is
void as providing for unconscionable liquidated damages and a
penalty.
The Summary Judgment award of $34,000.00 at eighteen percent (18%) interest per annum is not reasonably related by any
stretch of the imagination to Respondent's actual damages
(whatever they may be).

In reviewing the Lease and Discount

Sheet (R. 216), it shows Respondent, if truly the successor-ininterest of MFT, to be receiving $24,030.89 in payments prior to
default, plus Summary Judgment award of $33,893.23, totalling
$57,924.12 substantially more than the total Lease value over
five (5) years ($46,511.40) [R. 216; A. 34]), including all
right, title and interest in the leased equipment, all of
this despite the fact that the lease term does not expire until
September of 1986!
There are numerous cases standing for the proposition that
damages awarded—regardless of Summary Judgment--are a penalty
and void as a matter of law if no reasonable relationship is
borne to any actual damages suffered and yet in this case,
Respondent has not even bothered to prove its actual damages.
Numerous cases stand for this proposition, the following of
which are but a few.

Young Electric Sign Co* v« Vedas, 564
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P.2d 758, 760, (Utah 1979); Russell v. Ogden Union Ry & Depot
Co., 122 Utah 107 247 P.2d 257 (1952); Croft B. Jensen, 86 Ut.
13, 40 P.2d 198 (1935); Double D Amusement Co, v. Hawkins,
supra,; Reed v. Armstrong, 6 Utah 2d 127, 312 P.2d 777 (1957).
In Ricker v. Rombough, 261 P.2d

328, 120 CA 2d Supp. 912

(1953) the court held that a rent acceleration clause in a lease
in unenforceable and void as being an agreement for liguidated
damages when the damages are readily ascertainable and such is
void if no reference is made to actual damages.
In In the Matter of Grodnik's, 128 F. Supp. 941 (U.S.D.C. D.
Minn. 1955) the court held that contract provisions providing
for liguidated damages in the event of default are prima facie
valid; yet they will be declared invalid only where damage is
stipulated and there is no reasonable relationship to the
amount of actual injury suffered.
In Ray v. Electrical Products Consolidated, 390 P.2d 607
(Wyo. 1964) the Wyoming Supreme Court held that a provision in a
contract fixing damages for breach will be construed as a
penalty or forfeiture and hence unenforceable if it bears no
reasonable relationship to the amount of actual damages.
In Green, et al., v. Nelson, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
held

that Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the full
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amount of the unpaid balance on a contract without showing their
actual loss occasioned by Defendant's breach.
In Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 449f 450, (Utah 1952)
the Utah Supreme Court held that where parties to a contract
stipulate to an amount of liquidated damages that shall be paid
in the case of a breach of contract, such stipulation is
generally enforceable, if the amount stipulated is not disproportionate to damages actually sustained.

Further, where enfor-

cement of a forefeiture provision in a contract would result in
an unconscionable and exorbitant recovery bearing no reasonable
relationship to actual damages suffered, the forfeiture provision is unenforceable.
In Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court held that where a forefeiture under literal terms
of a contract results in awarding to a party a sum so entirely
disproportionate to any damages he may have suffered that it
shocks the conscience of the Court, a court of equity will
neither approve nor enforce such a penalty.
It is clear the award of the Summary Judgment is not supported by the Lease or if reconcilable with the Lease, is void
on its face as a penalty.
Furthermore, the provisions in the Summary Judgment
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awarding Respondent future and certain additional damages is
void as it violates the premise that a judgment is final and
settles all rights, claims, and obligations between the subject
parties.

The Summary Judgment grants future amounts which can-

not presently be ascertained.
CONCLUSION
There are infinite issues of fact precluding Summary
Judgment in this case.

In Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders

of Canada Ltd., v. Y-Tex Corp. 590 P.2d 1306, (1979) the
Supreme Court of Wyoming held that if there is any doubt as to
the meaning of a written instrument there arises an issue of
fact to be litigated and Summary Judgment is improper.

In this

case the lower court made such an exclusively factual determination sua sponte.
Summary Judgment is a harsh measure and for such reasons contentions of a party opposing the motion must be considered in a
light most advantageous to him and all doubts resolved in permitting him to go to trial.

The motion should be granted only when,

viewing the matter thusly, no right to recovery can be established.
Controlled Receivables,

Inc. v. Harman, 17 Ut. 2d 420, 413 P.2d

807 (Utah 1966) .
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The sustaining of Summary Judgment without affording a party
the opportunity to present his evidence is a stringent measure
which the Court should be reluctant to grant.
12 ut. 2d 388, 367 P.2d 179, (1962).

Tangren v. Ingalls,

In the case at bar the

lower court made evidentiary conclusions about the Lease and
truth as to the numerous controverted facts, the Okland's affirmative defenses relative to the damages awarded, the nature of
the Lease, and the intent of the parties—all when Respondent
was not even a party to the Lease.

Such is clear injustice and

manifest error as in Summary Judgments evidence is not reviewed,
yet the lower court ruled the leased equipment had disappeared.H
Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974).
In the case of Elrod v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co.
of Des Moines, Iowa, 440 P.2d 544, 201 Kan. 254 (1968), the Court
held that the amount of loss or damage is generally a fact issue
which should not be determined by an affidavit on a motion for
summary judgment.
P.2d

In Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562

238, (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that the

presence of a dispute itself as to what is a
disallows the granting of summary judgment.

material fact
Thus the kind and

nature of agreement is relevant and Appellant has been wholeheartedly deprived of an opportunity to present such relevance
at a trial.
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In Fredrick May & Co. v. Dunny 13 Ut. 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266,
(1962), the Utah Supreme Court held "that where there are
complicated legal questions presented and it appears that if
issues were tried, other evidence would be adduced, it is wise
policy to deny summary judgment and determine issues of fact by
trial."
In the recent Supreme Court case of Haggis Management, Inc.
vs. Turtle Management, Inc., 19 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 42, 45, (October
3, 1985), the Honorable Justice Stewart in his unequivocal
dissenting opinion said:
"Where different inferences and conclusions can be
drawn, summary judgment is inappropriate, even if the
underlying facts are not disputed. Ultimate questions
of mixed fact and law —such as the instant case — are
not to be discarded by a judge in derogation of a
party's right to trial by jury. Butler v. Sports Haven
International, Utah, 563 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1977).
"This rule is in accord with what numerous courts have
held. Even if the basic evidence is not in conflict,
summary judgment is not appropriate if a jury could draw
differing, but reasonable conclusions from that evidence.
See, e.g. , ITT Terryphone Corp. v. Modem's Plus, Inc. 19 71
GA. App. 710, 320 S.E.

2nd 784, 787 (1984);

Lundy v.

Hazen, 90 Ida. 323, 411 P.2d 768, 770 (1966). In this
case a jury trial should have been demanded and the case
should have been submitted to a jury." Haggis Management,
Inc., supra, at 45.
For the above reasons, Okland urges that the Court relieve
itself of the burden of further inquiry into Appellant's riqht
to a trial on the issue of damages (as it has acknowledged
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liability) and that the Court forthwith reverse and remand the
Summary Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, with specific guidelines as to what Respondent must prove to show it
acted reasonably in order to be entitled to any recovery, let
alone its conceivable "double recovery".
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of June, 1986,

JohiY Michael Coomba
/ttorney for Appellant Okland

Leonard W. Burningham
Attorney for Appellant Okland
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four (4) copies each of Appellant's
Brief have been delivered to Kyle W. Jones, 1000 Continental
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101; L. R. Gardiner, FOX,

EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN, Attorney for Robert M. Simonsen and
Simpar Associates, 57 West 200 South, Suite 400, P. 0. Box 3450,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84110; and four (4) copies have been
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mailed to Doug Bradshaw, Bradshaw Development Company and City
Gate Condominium Partnership, c/o Douglas C.
Cresta Avenue, Santa Barbara, California

Bradshaw, 4164

93102, this 6th d

of June, 1986.

'chcfel Coombs
Leonard W. Burningham
attorneys for A p p e l l a n t
DELIVERED by m

this

day of J u n e , 1986.
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ADDENDUM

w

9-

Michael J. Wilkins
WILKINS & JONES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
200 South Main, Suite 1020
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 328-4760
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE *CDWf
STATE OF UTAH

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, a
Utah corporation,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
vs.
OKLAND LTD. INC., and
BRADSHAW FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
both Utah corporations,

Civil No.

Defendants.

As a cause of action against the defendants, plaintiff alleges
as follows:
1.

Plaintiff First Security Financial is a Utah corporation

engaged in the thrift, loan and equipment leasing business with its principal
place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

Defendants Okland Ltd.

Inc., and Bradshaw Ferrin Development

Company, now known as Bradshaw Development Company, are both Utah corporations
with their principal places of business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

On or about September 30, 1981, Okland Ltd. Inc. and Bradshaw

Ferrin Development Company as lessees entered into an Equipment Lease Agreement with MFT Leasing as lessor, a true and complete copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit A and Incorporated herein by this reference.
4.

First Security Financial is the successor in interest to MFT

A. 1

r-nooOS

Leasing under the Equipment Lease Agreement, entitled to all of the benefits
thereunder.
5.

The Equipment Lease Agreement provides for the payment of

certain periodic rental payments to the lessor, not all of which have been
made when due.
6.

As a result of the failure of the lessees to make the payments

as and when due, the Equipment Lease has been declared in default.
7.

Pursuant to the terms of the Equipment Lease, the lessees are

jointly and severally liable to plaintiff in the amount of $26,423.95, plus
interest thereon at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from and
after May 1, 1984 until fully paid, both before and after judgment, plus
costs of court, expenses of repossession and sale of the equipment, and
attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendants,
jointly and severally, in the amount of $26,423.95 plus interest thereon eft
eighteen percent (18%) per annum from and after May 1, 1984 until fully paid,
both before and after judgment, plus costs of court, expenses of repossession
and sale of the equipment, attorney's fees, and such other and further relief
as the court deems just or the right to which may be established at trial.
DATED this /^ ~ day of May, 1984
WILKINS & JONES

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Plaintiff's address:
135 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
-2-

MFT LEASING
135 South Mam Street
ASSIGNED TO MFT LEASING
COMMERCIAL SEGUSITY BANK

ay ^ ~^L(jf

Sa,t U k e

°ltV'

Utfth

COMMERCIAL

LEASE

10-0031743-6
NO.
((ALWAYS ftCFEA TO ABOVE NO)

S^ V

VICE PRESIDENT

" ~

, - A

A

L E A S E A G R E E M E N T made and entered tnto th.s j L S t f e a y of
Nces at 135 South Mam Street. Salt Lake City

1—

Q{
194L by and between MFT LEASING a Utah corporation with ol-

Utah 84111. ( Lessor') and ( Lessee '

OKLAND LTD INC. and
BR/IDSHAW F^RTN pEVELOPMENT fOMPAN\
As C o - L e s s e e s
699 E a s t South Temple
S u i t e 310
— S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 841U2 LeTseT
Laseor hereby leasas to Leaaee. and Leaaee hereby leases from Letaor the following described personal property (the Equipment) upon the following
terms and conditions *
QTY

SUPPLIER NAME AND AOORESS

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

SERIAL NO

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT A WHICH BECOMES A PART HEREOF

y X ) If this Block is checked, see Exhibit A consisting of _ - L _ pages attached hereto and a part hereof for Quantity, Serial Numbers. Description Supplier and other Equipment information
The Equipment will at all times during the term of this lease oe located at the address of Lessee shown above or at

TERMS AttP CONDITIONS Of LSASS
1

L E A S E TERM AND P A Y M P N T

Lessee shall pay Lessor at us

Commencement, Pate;.
T

*""

S1X t

^m

Monthe

offices m Salt Lake City Utah or at such other place as Lessor may

Leese

designate in writing the periodical rental payments for the term in-

Monthly Rental Payment % 7 ^ 8

, ?8

dicated
It other than monthly rental pavments the terms are as
fOllOWS . _ _ » _ _ » « - _ _ _ - - - - _ - - - _ « - _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ — - _ - _ - _ —

Monthly Use Tea:

i Q l -

—mm]

$

:

36

*

Total Monthly

775,19

Rental Payment:
In addition, advance payments equal to the first and last .

_months rental payments in the total amount of Si

, 5 5 0 . 3 8

u due and payable upon acceptance of thts lease by Lessor

2 NO WARRANTIES BY LESSOR LESSEE HAS SELECTED BOTH ia) EQUIPMENT AND ID) SUPPLIER FROM WHOM LESSOR IS TO PURCHASE IT LESSOR MAKES
NO WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED AS TO ANY MATTER WHATSOEVER INCLUDING THE CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT ITS MERCHANTABILITY OR ITS FITNESS
FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND AS"To LESSOR LESSEE LEASES EQUIPMENT AS is
3 CLAIMS AGAINST SUPPLIER. If Equipment is not properly installed does not operate as represented or warranted by Supplier or is unsatisfactory for any reason
Lessee shall make any claim on account thereof solely against Supplier and snail nevertheless pay Lessor all rent payable under trus lease Lessor will include as a condition of us purch*** order that Supplier agree that all warranties agreements and representations if any which may oe made Oy Supplier to Lessor may oe en forced Oy
Lessee in its own name Lessor hereoy agrees to assign to Lessee and does hereoy assign solely for the purpose ol making, and prosecuting any said claim all of the rights
which Lessor nas against Supplier toi Oreach of warranty or otn<w lepieteniauon respecting Equipment
I
* SUPPLIER NOT AN AGENT Lessee understands and «gret»s mat nenner Supplier nor any salesman or other agent of Supplier is an agent of Lessor and that Lessor
is not an agent of Supplier No salesmen or agent of Supplier is authorized to waive or alter any term or condition of this lease and no representation as to Equipment or any
other matter by Supplier shatl in any way affect Lessee s duty to pay the rent and perform us other ooiiqations as set forth m this lease
5 OROERING EQUIPMENT. Lessee hereby requests Lessor to purchase the Equipment from the aoove named Suppliers) Lessor agrees to purchase the Equiomemaa
selected by Lessee and Lessee agrees to arrange tor delivery of the Equipment so that n can be accepted on or before the commencement date of this lease as set forth in
paragraph t above Lessee hereby authorizes Lessor to insert m this lease the commencement date identification numbers and other descriptive data for the Equipment
6 AGREEMENT INCLUOES REVERSE StOE HEREOF This lease including the reverse side hereof correctly sets »onf\ the entire lease agreement between Lessor and
Lessee and no agreement or understanding claimed by either party hereto snail be binding unless specifically set fonn herein Tne term Lessee as used herein shall mean
and incluoe any and all Lessees who sign hereunder earn of whom shall be jointly and severally bound hereby
7 DECLARATION OF BUSINESS PURPOSE Lessee hereby warrants and represents mat the Equipment will be used fo» business purposes and not for personal family
household or agricultural purposes Lessee acknowledges that Lessoi has relied upon mis representation m emenrq into ihis lease

THIS LEASE ALSO INCLUDES ALL TERMS AND PROVISIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF
THIS LEASE CANNOT BE CANCELLED BY LESSEE.
LESSOR

- L £ £ 2 £ E (Authorized Slgnalur* t

Till*)

Data Executed by Leasee
Data

pted
Lesaea's Social Security NumOej
Empk*er * 1.0. Number j±

EXHIBIT A

(II Corporation President Vice Presidenti or Treasurer sneutt
snouM
sign and give official title if Proprietor or Partner, state which)

en

A

'«*cJfc

L

M F T LEASING
EXHIBIT A

SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT (MANUFACTURER, MAKE/ MODEL S, DESCRIPTION)

SERIAL NO.

QUANTITY

NAME OF LESSEE
Okland LTD. Inc. and
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company
699 East South Temple Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102

1

Floral Brass Arrangement

1

Exterior Rendering of Wilshire Condo.

7

10M Palms

3

8M Ferns

5

J

10" Baskets

2

10" Baskets

3

8" Trays

1

Sofa Orlanda Garden

i

!

Circular Hunt Desk

2

Green High Back Arm Chairs

1

Leather Arm Chair

1

Lamp Table Lattice

1

Lattice Couch Table

5

Oak Frame & Glass for Renderings

1

Oak Frame for Large City Scape Photo

2

Builder/Developer Panel

2

Frames

1

Availability Board 2-Color Sil Screened
Frame and Glass
Prints and Mounting

1

1 Sign for Hallway 20 x 20 2-Color 1 Side Installed

'*/r/

DATE:
LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE.
NAME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO

LEASE N O . :

10-0031743-6

BY : ^ . ^ 0 1 £ P

S ^
TITLE .

IGNATURE

BE SHOWN ABOVE.
BY

SIGNATURE

/

TiSfi-

(,

^

M F T LEASING
EXHIBIT A

Ok land L T D . T O , ^ E S S E E

SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT

Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company
699 East South Temple Suite 310
Salt Lake Ciy, Utah
84102

QUANTITY

SERIAL NO.

EQUIPMENT- (MANUFACTURER, MAKE, MODEL {, DESCRIPTIONj
Sign for Exterior - 30 x 30 2-Color 2 Sides Installed
Rug 6 x 9

Flora Green

36 x 72 Oak Windsor Desk
No. 2395 Lamp Brass
Peach Sofa
No. 103 Camel Chairs, Armed
811 SW Camel Chair Exec.
Windsor Left Oak Steno Desk
720 Beige Chairs
750S Green Chair Exec.
1 ro LI

9/16" Ecco Bond Pad (33.33 yds)
Rug(Oriental in entry)
No. 8292 Landscape Picture
No. 8273 Dear in Forest Picture
Scale Model of the Wilshire Condominium
Interior Renderings of Wilshire
Silk Screened Floor Plans 2-Color w/Backlighting
Floor Plan Display Tables
Large Table Housing 3 Floor Plans
Large Table for Scale Model Display

6

Ink Floor Plans § Photostats
DATE:

LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE.
NAME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO
BE SHOWN ABOVE.

?/*/£/

LEASE NO.: 10-0031743-6

Sec-.

BY:

TT^TGNATurar ^ ^ ^ ^

SIGNAT

TITLE .

TITLE-

GtO-

M F T LEASING
EXHIBIT A

SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT

QUANTITY

SERIAL NO.

NAME OF LESSEE
Okland LTD Inc. and
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company!
699 East South Temple Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

EQUIPMENT (MANUFACTURER, MAKE,* MODEL S, DESCRIPTION

2

30 x 36 Sample Board Panels for Interior Design

1

30 x 52 Sample Board Panel for Interior Desing

i/**A'

DATE:
LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE.
NAME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO

LEASE NO.

10-0031743-6

BY:

^AJUJL

/TSIGN
SIGNATURE

BE SHOWN ABOVE.

Ser<
TITLH

/ ^
^SIGNATURE

A.

6

'

TITLC

^CYOOS

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS - #3639
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-0833
Attorney for Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff ,
vs.

AMENDED ANSWER, CROSS-CLAIM
AND
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

OKLAND LTD. INC., and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO. ,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.
OKLAND LTD., INC.,
Third-Party
Plaintiff ,

Civil No. C-84-2941
Judge Billings

vs.
DOUG BRADSHAW, ROBERT M.
SIMONSEN, CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP,
a limited partnership,
and JOHN DOES 1 - 5,
Third-Party
Defendants.

oooOooo
Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , by and through its attorney of
record, John Michael Coombs, hereby amends its response to the

-1A. 7

specific allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint and affirmatively
defends as follows as permitted by leave of court given this
Defendant on September 6, 1985,
1.

Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. has insufficient knowledge

or information with which to either admit or deny the first
allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint, and therefore denies
Plaintiff's first allegation in its Complaint.
2.

Defendant Okland Ltd.f Inc. , has insufficient

knowledge or information to either admit or deny the second
allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint, and therefore denies
Plaintiff's second allegation in its Complaint.
3.

Defendant Okland Ltd., Inc., denies paragraph three of

Plaintiff's Complaint in that Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" does not
set forth the entire agreement between the parties.
4.

Defendant Okland Ltd., Inc., has insufficient knowledge

or information with which to either admit or deny paragraph four
of Plaintiff's Complaint and therefore, denies the same.
5.

Defendant Okland Ltd., Inc., has insufficient knowledge

or information with which to either admit or deny paragraph five
of Plaintiff's Complaint and therefore, denies the same.
6.

Defendant Okland Ltd., Inc., has insufficient knowledge

or information as to whether Defendant lessee and other successors in interest have failed to make payment as and when
due* . and as a result thereof , said Equipment Lease has been

-2
\.

8

tiQQ'l'Jan

declared in default, and therefore, denies paragraph six of
Plaintiff's Complaint.
7.

Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , denies the allegations in

paragraph seven of Plaintiff's Complaint.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
8.

Plaintiff's several allegations fail to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.
9.

Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , has acted in good faith

with respect to Plaintiff's several allegations contained herein.
10.

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages of which

it complains herein.
11.

Plaintiff's claims are barred by failure of

consideration.
12.

Plaintiff's claims are barred by the fact that the

agreement between the parties involves a security interest
governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
CROSS-CLAIM
Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , cross-claims against
co-Defendant lessee Bradshaw Development Company as follows:
1.

On September 30 , 1981 , James G. Okland, on behalf of

Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , signed the subject Equipment Lease
attached to Plaintiff's Complaint s Exhibit "A", a true and
correct copy of which is attached as Plaintiff's Exhibit

,f M

A and

cosigned by Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company now known as

-3A. 9

Defendant Bradshaw Development Company, a Utah corporationf in
which Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw is a principal
shareholder.
2.

Approximately 60 days subsequent to said cosigning by

Defendant Okland Ltd. f Inc. f of said Equipment Lease , Defendant
Okland Ltd. , Inc. , withdrew from The Wilshire Project which
concerned said lease, leaving co-Defendant Bradshaw Development
Company and others, including all known and unknown Third-Party
Defendants in full responsiblity and liability therefor.
3.

Defendant Okland failed to apply to Plaintif lessor

for written permission to be removed as guarantor of the subject
Equipment Lease as per the terms of said Equpment Lease based on
the oral representations of Defendant Bradshaw Development
Company that such would not be necessary.
4.

Defendant Bradshaw Development Company, along with

other named and unnamed successors in interest, Third-Party
Defendants herein, made payment of certain periodic rental
payments to Plaintiff/Lessor up until the time of the alleged
default , and Defendant Bradshaw Development Company has at all
times material herein, had the exclusive use, benefit and
enjoyment of all equipment under the subject Equipment Lease
all of which has caused Defendant Okland damage.
5.

Defendant Bradshaw Development Company, by and through

its officer and director, Doug Bradshaw, has represented to

-4
A. 10

*oO

Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , that it wold payf assume and hold
Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. , harmless from all payments and
liability under said Equipment Lease, the default of which has
caused Defendant Okland Ltd. , Inc. damage.
WHEREFORE, Co-Defendant Okland prays for judgment against
Defendant Bradshaw Development Company for any and all amount
which is liable to Plaintiff pursuant to Plaintiff's Complaint
on file herein, for interest thereon, costs of court, out-ofpocket or other expenses, attorney's fees, and any and all
other relief the Court deems just or equitable in the preimises.
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Okland hereby complains
of named Third-Party Defendant and unknown Third-Party
Defendants pursuant to Rule 9(a)(2) as follows:
1.

Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw is a resident of

the State of Utah and is director, officer and principal shareholder in Bradshaw Development Company, defendant herein.
2.

Third-Party Defendant Robert M. Simonsen is a Utah resident

and successor in interest to Okland Ltd. , Inc. , under the subject Equipment Lease, damages for the default of which Plaintiff
complains of in its Complaint on file herein.
3.

Third-Party Defendant City Gate Condominium Partnership

is a Utah limited partnership and successor in interest to
Okland Ltd. , Inc. , with respect to the subject Equipment Lease.

A. 11

4.

John Does 1-5 are heretofore unknown Third-Party

Defendants, successors in interest to Defendant Okland Ltd, f who
have caused damage to Defendant Okland by virtue of Plaintiff's
Complaint and have had the usef benefit, and enjoyment of the
equipment subject hereto, and at such time as their names are
discovered Third-Party Plaintiff Okland shall amend its
Complaint herein accordingly,
COUNT I
BREACH OF CONTRACT
5.

Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw orally represented

to Third-Party Plaintiff that he , in conjunction with each and
all other Third-Party Defendants would be responsible for the
subject Equipment Lease and any default thereof.
6.

Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw in conjunction with

each and all other Third-Party Defendants has breached his
agreement to be responsible and liable for the subject Equipment
Lease for which Third-Party Plaintiff may be liable to
Plaintiff.
7.

Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw has failed to so

indemnify or so assure Third-Party Plaintiff and otherwise
secure a written consent from Plaintiff on Okland's behalf as to
relinquishing Third-Party Plaintiff's liability under the subject Equipment Lease.
8.

Third-Party Defendant Doug Bradshaw's breach of his

-6A. 12

oral agreement on behalf and in conjunction with each and all
Third-Party Defendants has caused Third-Party Plaintiff Okland
damage.
COUNT II
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
9.

Third-Party Plaintiff incorporates allegations 1

through 8 in its Third-Party Complaint as if they were set forth
more fully hereafter verbatim.
10.

Third-Party Defendants Simonsen, Bradshaw, and City

Gate Condominium Partnership and/or other unknown Third-Party
Defendants have each and all had the use, benefit, and enjoyment
of the equipment subject to the Equipment Lease herein and are
thereby liable to Third-Party Plaintiff for being unjustly
enriched at Third-Party Plaintiff's expense.
COUNT III
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
11.

Third-Party Plaintiff Okland Ltd. , Inc. , incorporates

allegations 1 through 10 in its Third-Party Complaint as if they
were set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
12.

Third-Party Plaintiff has relied to its detriment on

the representations of Third-Party Defendants that they, jointly
and severally as successors in interest to Defendant Okland on
The Wilshire Project would be liable under the subject Equipment
Lease.

-7A. 13

WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiff prays for jugment against
each and all Third-Party Defendants, jointly and severally, and
each and all unknown Third-Party Defendants on all three counts
in the amount that Third-Party Plaintiff may be liable to
Plaintiff, for interest thereon, costs of court, out-of-pocket
or other expenses, attorney's fees, and any and all other relief
as the Court deems just and equitable") in yne premis/s.
DATED this 9th day of September / 19/85///// S

faeir tfdombl
/Attorney for Okland Ltd. , Inc,
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this
1985,

10th

day of September,

I mailed a copy of the foregoing Amended Answer to

Steven D. Crawley, Attorney for Bradshaw Development Co., Doug
Bradshaw, and City Gate Condominium Partnership, Suite 107, 2225
East Murray-Holladay Road, Salt Lake City, Utah

84117; Kyle W.

Jones, Attorney for Plaintiff, 200 South Main, Suite 1000, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84101? and R. L. Gardiner, FOX, EDWARDS,

GARDINER & BROWN, 57 West 200 South, Suite J4Q0, P. O. Box 3450,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84110.

A. 14
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FILLED
Kyle W. Jones - 1744
Attorney for Plaintiff
200 South Main, Suite 1000

...

*

*>
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs

OKLAND LTD., INC. and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.
OKLAND LTD., INC.,

:
:
:
'.
.
:
:

AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF JUDGMENT.

:
:
:
:

Third-Party
Plaintiff,
VS .

:
:
:

Civil No. C-84-2941

:

DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN,
:
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP,:
a limited partnership and
:
JOHN DOES 1 - 5 ,
:
Third-Party
Defendants.

A. 15

:
:

Assigned:

Judge Billing

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
County of Salt Lake )
C. S. Cummings, upon oath, deposes and says:
1. That he is an officer of First Security Financial
and authorized to make this statement on its behalf.
2. That the matters set forth in this Affidavit are
true of affiant's own knowledge.
3. That affiant has reviewed the allegations contained
in the Complaint on file in this matter and knox^s the contents
thereof to be true.
4. That affiant has reviewed the original of the
Equipment Lease Agreement, a copy of which is attached to the
Complaint as Exhibit A, and does verify the Exhibit attached to the Complaint is identical in every respect to the original
document.
5. That as of the date of this Affidavit, defendants
Okland Ltd., Inc. and Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company, now
known as Bradshaw development Company are indebted to First
Security Financial in the amount of $26,423.95, as calculated
per the Lease, plus interest at the rate of eighteen percent
(18%) per annum until paid, plus costs of court, expenses of
repossession and sale of the equipment, and a reasonable attorney's
fee.
DATED this
^ day of April, 1985.

C. S. Cummings
Subscribed and sworn to before me this cfy^
April, 1985,

day of

•J r-c
Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, UT.
My commission expires:

-2A. 16

t?00ti35

Kyle W. Jones - 1744
Attorney for Plaintiff
200 South Main, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 359-7771

2-3
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,

:
:

Plaintiff,

:

OKLAND LTD., INC. and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
'

:
:
:
:
:

vs.

Defendants.

:

Third-Party
Plaintiff,

:
:

AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OKLAND LTD., INC.,

Civil No. C-84-2941
vs.
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN,
'.
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP,:
a limited partnership and
:
JOHN DOES 1 - 5 ,
:
Third-Party
Defendants.

A. 17

:
:

Assigned:

Judge Billin

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

:

SS .

D.R.Russell, upon oath, deposes and says:
1. That he has access to the files of First Security
Financial and is authorized by it to make this statement on
it's behalf.
2. That the matters set forth in this affidavit are true
of affiant's own knowledge.
3. That affiant has reviewed the allegations contained
in the complaint on file in this matter and knows the contents
thereof to be true.
4. Affiant has reviewed the orginals of the Equipment Lease
Agreement, the corportate resolution, Check no 16535 written by
MFT laseing to defendants,both front and back, and the Bill of
Sale to the defendants, copies of which are attached to this
affidavit as exhibits A through D, and does verify the
exhibits are identical in every respect to the original
documents.
5- That the equipment listed on the Schedules to the
Equipment Lease Agreement was delivered to the defendants £nd
that it has not been repossessed by the plaintiff.
6. That as of the date of this affidavit, defendant Okland
is indebted to the plaintiff pursuant to the Eqipment Lease
agreement as follows:
a. 31 payments at $775.19
$24,030.89
(last payment 2/29/84)
b. property taxes for 1984
$
363.52
c. property taxes for 1985
$
341.80
d. Late charges (31months)
$ 1,201.25
(.05 x 775.19=$38.75)
e. Interest(18% t>er annum
$ 6,055.77
from May 1, 1984)
subtotal
together with attorney's fees

$31,993.23

as provided by the Equipment Lease

Agreement and the expeneses of location, repossession and sale.
A- 18

~2~

of the leased equipment.
DATED this <^£2'^day of September, 1985.

^-^W^j^^
Subscribed and sworn to before me this g?Q

day of September,

1985.

-n
Notary^
Jtary^Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Ut~
My commission expires-. / ^ - /
-So

A. 19
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS - #3639
72 East 400 South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7074
E. PAUL WOOD - #3537
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
Attorneys for Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OKLAND LTD. INC., and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.
OKLAND LTD., INC.,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

Civil No. C-84-2941
Judge Billings

vs.
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSON,
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP, a limited partnership
and JOHN DOES 1 - 5 ,
Third-Party
Defendants.

-1
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oooovo

oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS beinq first duly sworn, deposes and
says as follows:
1.

That I am legal counsel to Defendants/Third-Party

Plaintiff, Okland Ltd. Inc. in the above entitled matter.
2.

That I have had conversations with Kyle Jones, Attorney

for Plaintiff relative to the above.
3.

That in conversations Mr. Jones indicated to me that

the purported "lease" agreement was in actuality a "sale
leaseback" and not a "true" lease and therefore, my
understanding of the law is that the aqreement would be for
security.
4.

That while Plaintiff has additional time within which

to formally respond to Defendant/Third Party Defendant Okland
Ltd., Inc.'s First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production
of Documents and Requests for Admissions, Mr. Jones orally indicated to me that no documentation or other information exists or
is available as to the purported "lease" other than a notation
that the lease is in fact a "sale leaseback" including but not
limited to the absence of documentation as to the disposition of
the title of the property upon termination of the lease, the
residual on the lease, the payout, the actual damaqes of Plain-

-2
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000071

tiff, the identity of the beneficiary of the investment tax credits and depreciation, the useful life of the equipment, and
other factual matters relevant to the agreement between the parties and the liability ifor its breach.
DATED this f\_

day of May, 1985

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me/this IS ~ day of May,
1985.

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

S-s''*?
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fa Z0 NuAH'K
H. D!

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS - #3639
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-0833

' .^ERK

itr'L.

LJa*n<* Z^tfTEfiPc

Attorney for Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff ,
SUPPLEMENTAL AND REVISED
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES G. OKLAND
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
OKLAND LTD. INC. , and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO. ,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.
OKLAND LTD. , INC. ,
Third-Party
Plaintiff ,

Civil No. C-84-2941
Judge Billings

vs.
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSON ,
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP, a limited partnership
and JOHN DOES 1 - 5 ,
Third-Party
Defendants.

oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH
:ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

A. 23

JAMES OKLAND, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and
says that:
1.

I am the Secretary of Okland Ltd. , Inc. , and authorized

on behalf of the corporation to make this Affidavit.
2.

The statements made herein are based upon personal

knowledge.
3.

On or about the 30th day of September, 1981 , I signed

the Agreement attached to Plaintifffs Complaint as Exhibit "A".
4.

The Agreement does not reflect the actual agreement and

intent of Okland Ltd. , Inc. , the co-Defendant Rradshaw-Ferrin
Development Company and Murray First Thrift in that Okland Ltd. ,
Inc. , agreed to purchase the property from Murray First Thrift
rather than lease the property as described in the Agreement.
5.

At the end of the payment term, all of the property

described in the schedules should be owned by Okland Ltd. , Inc.,
and the co-Defendant Rradshaw-Ferrin Development Company and
title should pass to us.
6.

This creates a significant difference in that upon

passage of title , the equipment could be leased , sold or otherwise disposed of giving Okland Ltd. , Inc., subhstantial value
and return.
7.

Murray First Thrift orally agreed that Okland Ltd. ,

Inc. , and the co-Defendant Bradshaw Development Company at the
expiration of the Lease, would be the owners of the property,
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but that the Agreement should be styled in a lease form so that
Murray First Thrift could receive the investment tax credit on
the equipment.
8.

With respect to the alleged default under the

Agreement, I have never received an accounting of the application of payment made and believe that the amount requested in
Plaintifffs Complaint of $26f423.95 as of May 1, 1984 , is
erroneous.
9.

During the first part of April, 1984 f I received a com-

munication from the Plaintiff, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and incorporated herein by reference.
10.

At the time of the letter, which was April 3, 1984,

the entire balance due was $25,837.91 which is substantially
less than the amount prayed for in the Compl
11.

nt.

During the first part of May, 1984, I received the

letter from Plaintiff's attorney attached hereto as Exhibit "B"
and incorporated herein by reference.
12.

As of the date of Exhibit "B" , April 27, 1984, the

alleged amounts due for delinquent payment was 52,438.15 which
does not equal the delinquent balance claimed on April 3, 1984,
plus an additional monthly payment of $775.15.
13.

In addition, the original payment to Murray First

Thrift included the last monthly payment which, to my knowledge,
has not been applied to reduce the balance due and owing the
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agreement.
14.

To my knowledge, the Plaintiff has not attempted to

sell or otherwise dispose of the equipment which is the subject
of the Agreement to decrease the damages which they allegedly
have incurred as a result of alleged delinquent payments.
Further, the Plaintiffs have made no attempt to retrieve the
furniture.
15.

That the Equipment Lease does not contain the oral

understandings between the parties which existed prior to and
contemporaneous with the signing of the Lease including but not
limited to the fact that the Equipment Lease did not even allude _
to the fact that the transaction was in actuality a sale leaseback , not a true lease.
16.

In addition, there were oral understandings as to the

"residual" on the Lease which are not contained in the Lease,
namely who would own the equipment upon expiration of the lease
terms and conditions and what that unstated "residual" was or
would be and upon what such was based.
17.

Finally, the written lease does not contain the

several oral understandings as to the investment tax credits ,
depreciation, and other tax considerations and were purposely
not put in the "lease" , including the "residual" , as it was my
understanding that if these terms were written into the lease it
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would not be a "lease" but another instrument more like a
collateral sales agreement or security agreement which would
more accurately reflect the true understanding of the parties
hereto.
18.

Lastly, I do not believe that Okland Ltd., Inc. received

any of the consideration for the sale portion of the sale leaseback, a transaction which is not even mentioned in the "lease.
DATED this

]

[A

day of September, 1985.
-i
.

k

( (

£

JAMES G. OKLANfr
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before/fne
September, 1985.

Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:

•g/y?
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

ay of September,

1985, I mailed a ocpy of the foregoing Supplemental and Revised
Affidavit to Steven D. Crawley, Attorney for Defendant Bradshaw,
2225 East 4800 South, Suite 107, Salt Lake City, Utah

84117;

Kyle W. Jones, Attorney for Plaintiff, 200 South Main Street,
Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101; and to L. R./fGardiner,

Jr., Attorney for Third-Party Defendant/simonsen, 5/1/ W^£r^ 200
South, Suite 400, P. O. Box 3450, Sal? /Lak^/^L^y ,/l^ta^// $411f).
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TELEPHONE. (801) 350-5270

April 3, 1984

Oakland Ltd Inc.
1978 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

RE:

Lease No. 531743

Dear Gentlemen:
In accordance with the terms of your Lease Agreement and default
provisions there-in, we hereby formally declare the above referenced
lease in default and make demand for payment as follows:
Payment amount due:
Lease Balance:

$ 1,598.37
$ 24,239.54

If this matter is not resolved to our satisfaction within (10) days
from the date of this letter, we will proceed with all remedies that
are available to us under the Lease Agreement.
Should you decide to bring this lease current rather than pay the lease
off and purchase the equipment, we will not tolerate furt!"er delinquent
rental payments. Your payments will be expected on the date due.

Sincerely yours:

cc:

Joseph W. Winterer VP

A.
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EXHIBIT ";

U002Q
A SUftSIDIAftY OF FIRST SICUtlTY CORFOtATIOM

EXHIBIT

WILKINS

M

BM

6c J O N E S

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
t O O S O U T H MAIN,SUITE I O t O
S A L T LAJCE C I T Y , U T A H
MICHAEL J.WILKINS
DIANE W.WILKINS
KYLE W.JONES

84101
TELEPHONE
{S0D326-4760

April 27, 1984

-tflcland Limited
1978 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 492 388 253

Bradshaw Development Co.
c/o Steven D. Crawley
50 South Main, Suite 880
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 492 388 254

Douglas C. Bradshaw
1149 Mercedes Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 492 388 255

Re:

Okland Limited/Bradshaw Development Lease

Gentlemen:
This firm has been retained to represent the interests of First Security Financial
with respect to an unpaid equipment lease obligation originally between MFT Leasing as
lessor and Okland Limited and Bradshaw Ferrin Development as lessees. First Security
Financial is the successor in interest to MFT Leasing.
Formal demand is hereby made that the unpaid payments through April, 1984, in the
total amount of $2,438.15, plus attorney's fees of $150.00 for a total payment of
$2,588.15, be made within ten (10) days of the date of this letter.
Your certified or cashier's check, made payable to "First Security Financial"
should be mailed or delivered so as to be received by the undersigned within the time
period specified.
Your failure to make the payment as required will result in immediate legal actior
to protect the interests of First Security Financial.
Govern yourselves accordingly.
WILKINS & JONES

7
Michael J . Wilkins
MJW:js
cc:

First Security Financial
A. 29
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ivyie w. Jones - 1/44
Attorney for Plaintiff
200 South Main, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 359-7771

daJLj

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ft J- SKd f hfO

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

.%$>

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
OKLAND LTD., INC. and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants
OKLAND LTD., INC. ,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

Civil No. C-84-2941
vs.
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN,
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP,
a limited partnership and
JOHN DOES 1 - 5 ,

Assigned:

Judge Billings

Third-Party
Defendants.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant
Okland Ltd., Inc., came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable

A. 30

77
u, 0 o -

Judith Billings, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday,
September 23, 1985, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff appeared
by and through its attorney of record, Kyle W. Jones, and
defendant Okland Ltd., Inc. appeared by and through its attorney
of record, John Michael Coombs. No other parties appeared on
behalf of any of the other parties in this matter. The court,
after hearing the arguments in this matter, having reviewed the
pleadings on file herein, finds that there is no factual issue
with respect to whether or not the contract involved is a lease
or a security agreement or a contract of guarantee and that
plaintiff has properly pursued its remedies and that there is no
evidence to support defendantfs allegation that the plaintiff
failed to mitigate its damages thereby the court enters this
Judgment as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant Okland
Ltd., Inc., be granted and that plaintiff be awarded Judgment in
the following amounts:
$24,030.89 amount remaining to be paid under contract;
363.52 property taxes for 1984;
341.80 property taxes for 1985;
1,201.25 late charges pursuant to contract;
6, 055.77 interest;
1,900.00 attorney's fees
$33,893.23 Total Judgment
with interest on the total Judgment at eighteen percent (18%) per
annum as provided by the contract from the date of this Judgment
until paid, plus after accruing costs, attorney's fees and the
expenses of location, repossession and sale of the leased equipment
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiff be granted all necessary writs and orders necessary to
recover its leased equipment if and when it is located.
DATED this j^S day of September, 1985.
BY THE XOURT

By ^ Q ^ L ^ n f t C f

J>t CJrjTk

Juflge* Judith B i l l i n g s
~2~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a true and
exact copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment this / [> day of
September, 1985, postage prepaid, by U.S. mail, to:
John Michael Coombs
72 East 400 South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Steven D. Crawley
2225 East 4800 South, Suite 107
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
P. 0. Box 3450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

— _ — i . . . <

\. '..i

^

Kyle|W. Jones
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

* * *

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
PLAINTIFF,
-VS-

CIVIL NO. C-84-2941

OAKLAND LIMITED,

JUDGE'S RULING

DEFENDANT.

* * *

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 23RD DAY
OF SEPTEMBER, 1985, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 11:05 O'CLOCK
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY ThE
HONORABLE JUDITH M. BILLINGS, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH.

* * *

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
S i l t i t k e County Utah
MAR % A 19*0
OtputyOtf*

E i l e e n M. Ambrose, C . S . R .
A. 35

$70

APP

1

E A R A N C E S

2
3

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

KYLE W. JONES
ATTORNEY AT LAW
CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
72 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

4
5
6
7

84111

8
9

*

*

*

10
II

I N D E X

12
13

JUDGE'S RULING
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14
15

*

*

*

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

E i l e e n M. Ambrose, C.S.R.
A. 36

Jil

1
2
3

P R O C E E D I N G S
JUDGE BILLINGS:

THE COURT IS PREPARED TO RULE ON THE

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

4

THE COURT WILL GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

5

SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

6

BY THE DEFENDANT DO NOT MAKE SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPROPRIATE IN

7

THIS CASE WHERE THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS A LEASE FOR A SECURP

8

AGREEMENT.

9

PURSUED THEIR REMEDIES.

10

THE COURT FEELS THAT THE ARGUMENTS RAISED!

THE COURT FEELS THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS PROPERLY

THE COURT IS NOT PERSUADED THAT THERE IS SUFFICIE|I

H

EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS NOT AN

12

INTEGRATED CONTRACT AND THE COURT, THEREFORE, GRANTS SUMMARY|

13

JUDGMENT ON THAT CONTRACT AND FEELS IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE

14

WHETHER IT IS A CONTRACT OF GUARANTEE, CONTRACT OF LEASE OR

15

CONTRACT OF SECURITY AGREEMENT, THAT THE REMEDY SOUGHT, WHICtt

16

IS PAYMENT OF THE AMOUNT PROMISED, IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY

17

SINCE THERE HAS BEEN NO REPOSSESSION OF EQUIPMENT BECAUSE THp

18

EQUIPMENT HAS DISAPPEARED.

19

THIS FURTHER CONCLUDES THE DEFENSE FROM BEINjC

20

A FACTUAL ISSUE AS TO THE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO MITIGATE

21

DAMAGES AS THE COURT HAS FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF THAT BEFORE TH|1

22

COURT.

23

I AM GOING TO ASK COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO

24

PREPARE THE ORDER, GIVE IT TO COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT AND

25

THEN TO THE COURT FOR SIGNATURE.

Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R.

A. 37

3

37J2

1
2
3

MR. COOMBS: YOUR HONOR, WHAT ABOUT THE QUESTION OF
DAMAGES?

SHOULD THERE BE A TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES?

JUDGE BILLINGS:

NO.

I THINK THE AFFIDAVIT IS SUFFICIENT

4

EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES AND THERE ARE NO CONTRAVENING AFFIDAVITS!

5

TO INDICATE THOSE DAMAGES ARE NOT CORRECT.

6
7
8
9

(WHEREUPON, A DISCUSSION BETWEEN COURT AND COUNSEL
WAS HAD, AFTER WHICH, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD):
JUDGE BILLINGS:

AS FAR AS ATTORNEY'S FEES YOU WILL HAVJE

TO SUBMIT AN ATTORNEY'S FEES AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO THE RULES,

10

UPDATE YOUR AFFIDAVIT, SERVE IT TO COUNSEL.

IF THERE IS ANY|

11

OBJECTION TO THE ATTORNEY'S FEES THE COURT WILL HEAR THAT,

12

OTHERWISE IT WILL BE AS SUBMITTED IN THAT AFFIDAVIT.

13

COURT WILL BE IN RECESS.

14 I

(WHEREUPON, THE JUDGE'S RULING WAS CONCLUDED).

15
* * *

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R.
A. 38

P>

1 I

C E R T I F I C A T E

2
3 | S T A T E OF UTAH

)

4 | COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

SS.

5
6 1

I, EILEEN M . A M B R O S E , HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I

7

AM A CERTIFIED S H O R T H A N D REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH;

8

THAT AS SUCH C E R T I F I E D S H O R T H A N D REPORTER, I A T T E N D E D

9

T H E HEARING OF THE A B O V E - M E N T I O N E D MATTER AT THAT T I M E

10

A N D PLACE SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN

If

SHORTHAND THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS H A D

12

THEREIN; AND THAT T H E R E A F T E R

13

SHORTHAND NOTES INTO T Y P E W R I T I N G , AND THAT THE F O R E G O I N G

14

TRANSCRIPTION

I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID

IS A FULL, T R U E , AND CORRECT

TRANSCRIPTION

15 I OF THE S A M E .
16
17
18
EILEEN/ M(. AMBROSE,

C.S.R.

19
20
21
22 I M Y COMMISSION
23 I

JANUARY

EXPIRES:
14TH, 1 9 8 8 .

24
25

E i l e e n M. A m b r o s e ,

C.S.R.
A.

39
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